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In Vitro Fertilization: Third Party
Motherhood and the Changing
Definition of Legal Parent
With infertility on the rise, affecting one in six people,' lawyers
are advising more couples and doctors about the legal ramifications
of new reproductive technologies. 2 Although adoption is a more tradi-
tional means of providing children to infertile couples, adopting a
child can take four to seven years3 due to the reduced supply of
available infants.' In recent years couples have been looking for alter-
natives to adoption resulting in an increased use of artificial
insemination5 and surrogate mothers.
In a surrogate motherhood arrangement a woman produces a child
for a couple or single person by becoming impregnated through
artificial insemination with the husband's sperm.6 The woman carries
the fetus to term, and surrenders the child for adoption to the couple.7
Surrogate birth has the advantage of providing the couple with the
biological child of the husband.' A similar technique becoming
available is in vitro fertilization (IVF), commonly known as the "test
tube baby" technique. 9
IVF is a procedure by which an egg surgically is removed from
the ovary and placed in a shallow dish with a special medium and
1. The New Origins of Life, Tiam, September 10, 1984, at46 [hereinafter cited as Origins].
The National Center for Health Statistics reports the incidence of infertility among married
women aged 20 to 24, normally the most fertile age group, jumped 17% between 1965 and
1982. Id.
2. See Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies,
70 A.B.A.J. 50, 50 (August 1984).
3. See Origins, supra note 1, at 46; Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial
Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. Rv. 639, 639-40 (1983).
4. See Origins, supra note 1, at 46. The increased use of abortion to end unwanted pregnan-
cies combined with the growing social acceptance of single motherhood have contributed to
the decline in infants available for adoption. Id. See Comment, Parenthood by Legal Proxy:
Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth, 67 IowA L. REv. 385, 387 (1982); V. Packard, TBE
PEOPLE SHAPERS 209 (1977).
5. Artificial insemination by donor is the introduction of semen into the vagina by artificial
means DoRLANDs ILLUSTRATED MEDicAL D cTioNARY 785 (25th ed. 1974). In artificial insemination
by donor, a donor's sperm is used to inseminate the woman. Id.
6. See Comment, Protecting Inheritance Rights of Children Born Through IVF and Embryo
Transfer: Suggestions for a Legislative Approach, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 901, 902 (1983).
7. Id.
8. See Comment, supra note 4, at 387.
9. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 50.
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sperm from the husband.'" If fertilization occurs, the embryo is im-
planted in the uterus of the wife or another woman." The fetus then
is carried to term. 12 IVF is an attractive alternative to the twenty-five
percent of sterile women who are unable to conceive because of
blockage or an abnormality of the fallopian tubes.' 3 When the hus-
band's sperm is used to fertilize the wife's egg and the embryo is
implanted in the wife's uterus, few legal problems arise because the
situation closely resembles a normal pregnancy.
For a woman who can produce eggs but is unable to carry a child
to term, IVF is a technique that can allow the couple to have a child
that is genetically their own. " The wife's eggs can be fertilized with
the husband's sperm in a dish and the embryo implanted in the uterus
of another woman, who provides the use of her womb.' 5 IVF also
may be an attractive alternative to women who, although physically
able to have children, do not want to carry a fetus to term because
of a history of difficult pregnancies or career demands.' 6 The IVF
carrier of the couple's embryo is similar to a surrogate mother because,
as in surrogate motherhood, the IVF carrier is using her reproductive
capabilities to have a child for another couple."
10. Id. In vitro fertilization is the process by which an oocyte is removed from the female,
placed in a culture medium, and subsequently fertilized by sperm. Biggers, In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion and Embryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304 NEw ENo. J. MED. 336, 337-38 (1981). To
retrieve the ripe oocyte from the female donor, the donor is placed under general anesthesia
and a laparoscopy is performed. Id. The process involves making a small incision in the patient's
abdomen and inserting into the incision a laparoscope, an instrument allowing the doctor to
view the reproductive organs. Id. Follicular fluid containing the mature follicle or egg is then
aspirated from the ovary by use of a needle. Id. The fluid is mixed with prewashed semen
and diluted to simulate conditions found in the fallopian tubes. Id. A few hours later fertiliza-
tion may occur, and about twelve hours later, the embryo is transferred to a solution suppor-
tive of embryo development. Id. Approximately two days later, the fertilized egg develops into
an eight-celled embryo or blastocyst, and is transferred by means of a fine tube or cannula
into the uterus of the carrier female for implantation in the uterine wall. Id.
11. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 50.
12. Id.
13. See Kinney, Legal Issues of the New Reproductive Technologies, 52 CAL. ST. B.J.
514, 518 (1977). The fallopian tubes are thin flexible structures that convey the egg from the
ovaries to the uterus. See Origins, supra note 1, at 46, 48. If they are blocked, damaged or
frozen in place by scar tissue, the egg will be unable to reach the uterus and fertilization will
not occur. Id.
14. See Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Areas for Litigation,
35 Sw. L.J. 973, 976 (1982); Bowal, Surrogate Procreation: A Motherhood Issue in Legal
Obscurity, 9 QUEENS LAW JotnuAL 5, 9 (1983); S. KAUFMAN, NEW HOPE FOR THE CHILDLESS
CouPLE, 23 (1970) (discussing physical disorders giving rise to female infertility).
15. See Origins, supra note 1, at 46. This technique has been attempted several times,
but to date has not been successful. Id. at 52.
16. See Comment, supra note 4, at 388. Some commentators suggest that the primary
reason for allowing artificial birth procedures is to benefit those couples who are otherwise
physically unable to have children. Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly
Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 777, 802 (1970); see infra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
17. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 993. Some commentators claim the analogy to wet nurs-
1985 / In Vitro Fertilization
Not all new conception technologies, including the IVF third-party-
carrier technique, are available in every state because of restrictive
state laws on private adoptions and fetal research. Although not drafted
in contemplation of the lVF technique, these provisions create barriers
to the IVF procedure.' 8 Unless state laws are changed, general legal
principles from contract, tort, and constitutional law will be employed
to solve the unanticipated problems created by new conception
technologies. 9 Application of legal principles created before the
development of IVF may result in awkward and inappropriate results. 0
Therefore, development of a legal framework to resolve these new
issues is imperative.
This author will discuss the legal implications of IVF when used
by a husband and wife. Specifically, this author will focus on the
use of an IVF carrier to carry the couple's embryo to term when
the wife, although able to produce eggs, physically is unable to carry
a child. The discussion will begin with an examination of the con-
stitutional protection of marital privacy and privacy in intimate family
matters.2 The constitutional discussion will advance the argument that
the IVF technique should be protected constitutionally when the only
possibility for the couple to have a genetically related child is with
the use of an lVF carrier.
A brief overview of surrogate motherhood 22 will then be provided.
The similarities between the use of a surrogate mother and the use
of an IVF carrier may prompt courts to use current law from the
area of surrogate motherhood when dealing with an IVF situation.
Judicial refusal to enforce surrogate mother contracts might be used
to render IVF agreements between the couple and the IVF carrier
unenforceable. To discourage the application of surrogate mother con-
tract law to the IVF situation, this author will highlight the differences
between surrogate motherhood and the IVF procedure. After
distinguishing between surrogate motherhood and IVF, this author
will demonstrate that the policy arguments relied upon to find sur-
rogate mother contracts unenforceable as against public policy do not
apply to the use of an IVF carrier.
ing is perhaps more appropriate because the carrier has no genetic link to the child. Id. The
American Medical Association considers the IVF procedure a method of artificial insemina-
tion. Report of the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health Education and Welfare,
II-b-li (1979); Legal-Medical Studies, Inc., Report on Human Reproduction and the Law
(1979-81).
18. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 50.
19. See Kinney, supra note 13, at 514.
20. Id.
21. See notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
22. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
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After establishing that IVF may be protected constitutionally when
used by a couple unable to have children without the technique and
determining that public policy concerns are not great enough to find
IVF contracts unenforceable, this author will discuss current lav that
will be applied to decide parental rights if a controversy arises be-
tween the couple and the IVF carrier. "3 An examination of the statutory
provisions pertaining to parental rights will demonstrate that current
law must be amended legislatively to ensure proper determination of
parental rights when a child is born through IVF. Several legislative
alternatives that can be enacted will be suggested.
Finally, the rights and liabilities of the couple and the IVF carrier
will be examined.24 Specifically, the rights and liabilities discussion
will focus on the issues regarding the right to control the activities
of the carrier during the gestational period, the problems surround-
ing the decison to terminate the pregnancy, and visitation rights. Since
the necessity of dealing with the many issues surrounding IVF only
may arise if IVF is found to be embraced by the constitutional right
of privacy, this author preliminarily will evaluate the constitutional
issue.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO IVF
When a husband and wife are unable to conceive a child naturally,
they may decide to use other conception techniques to provide them
with genetically related offspring. When the wife is fertile, but is unable
to carry a child to term, IVF is an alternative that can provide the
couple with a genetically related child." The decision of a couple to
enter into an agreement with an IVF carrier may be included in the
constitutional protection of privacy in family matters26 or the right
of marital privacy.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right." When a fundamental
right is impacted by government the state must show that the state
objective is compelling and the means are narrowly drawn to achieve
23. See supra notes 82-143 and accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 144-210 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
26. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised
by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L.J. 1295, 1304-05 (1979); Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Hope
for Childless Couples Breeds Legal Exposure for Physicians, 17 UNIV. RicHMO1ND L.R. 311,
329-30 (1983); Lorio, supra note 14, at 1006-07.
27. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
28. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 26, at 1304-05.
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that objective. 29 If IVF is included in the right of privacy, only a
compelling state interest can justify imposing a burden on the couple's
decision to use IVF. To establish that IVF is included in the right
of privacy, an examination of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases
must be made.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,30 the United States Supreme Court found
that the right to marry, establish a home, and raise children is in-
cluded in the right of liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. 3' In Skinner v. Oklahoma,3 2 the Court recognized that
the right to be free of unwarranted government interference with pro-
creation is a basic civil right.33 The Court held that this "basic civil
right" could be taken away only by a showing of compelling statejustification." In the IVF situation, if the wife physically is unable
to carry the child to term, IVF may be the only procreative option
enabling the couple to have genetically related children. Thus, state
action restricting the availability of the couple's sole procreative option
could infringe upon their Skinner right to procreate.35
The array of cases holding that the Constitution embraces the right
to marital privacy may be broad enough to include the right to use
IVF as a method to have a genetically related child. The decision
to have a child has been held to be protected by the right of privacy
in Eisenstadt v. Baird.36 The Court stated that if the "right to privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
29. See Carey v. Population Service International, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977) ("Fundamen-
tal rights" are justified only by a "compelling state interest"); Kramer v. Union Free School
District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
30. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
31. Id. at 399.
32. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
33. Id. at 541.
34. Id.
35. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 1008; Note, supra note 26, at 330; Note, Surrogate
Motherhood Contractual Issues and Remedies Under Legislative Proposals, 23 WvAsnauRN L.J.
601, 612 (1984); Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman supra note 26, at 1302. Couples
might claim rights to use IVF in other factual situations involving the use of a surrogate. Id.
at 1309-10 n.84
"For example, couples might want to use a surrogate (1) when the use of a surrogate
is not necessary to create offspring genetically related to both parents, (2) when out
of choice or necessity only one parent retains a genetic link to the blastocyst, or(3) when out of choice or necessity neither parent maintains a genetic link to the
blastocyst. In these circumstances the claim of a fundamental right to IVF is more
attenuated and is less likely to be recognized." Id.
36. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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beget a child." 37 The decision whether to bear a child was held to
be at "the very heart of . . . constitutionally protected choices"38
in Carey v. Population Services International.39 Both Carey and
Eisenstadt dealt with government regulation of contraceptives, 40 but
if the Court is willing to support an individual's right to use artificial
means to prevent a pregnancy, the same court should be willing to
recognize the constitutional right to use artificial means to promote
a pregnancy." Thus, the decision to use IVF should be characterized
as a decision whether to bear or beget a child. Since this decision
is as private and personal as the decision to conceive a child through
intercourse, IVF should be constitutionally protected.42
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,43 recognized the
right of marital privacy as guaranteeing the right to be free of un-
justified governmental interference in deciding how to conceive a
child." This guarantee also may include the right of a married couple
to use IVF. Justice Goldberg, concurring, stated that the government
was not given the power to disrupt the traditional relation of the fami-
ly, including the decision how and when to have children, simply
because no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids
state interference in this area."8 If the decision to have a child falls
within the protected area of privacy, presumably the actual method
of carrying the child to term also would be protected. Thus, a cou-
ple's decision to use IVF would be protected under the right to
privacy."
Based upon the foregoing analysis of procreative rights, the right
to privacy should be interpreted by the Court to encompass the deci-
sion of the husband and wife to have a child through the use of IVF. 41
Recent decisions protecting couples from government intrusions relating
to marriage, procreation, and family relationships should be viewed
as protecting the fundamental right of the husband and wife to have
a genetically related child through the use of the IVF technique. 41
37. Id. at 453.
38. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
39. 314 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
40. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 26, at 1303.
41. See Note, supra note 26, at 331.
42. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 26, at 1303.
43. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44. Id. at 482-86.
45. Id. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46. See id.; Lorio, supra note 14, at 1008.
47. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 26, at 1311; Note, supra
note 26, at 329; Lorio, supra note 14, at 1006.
48. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 26, at 1300-05; Note, supra
note 26, at 329-32; Lorio, supra note 13, at 1008.
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Therefore, state regulations49 that limit the use of IVF may intrude
upon the fundamental right to marital privacy." As a result, any statute
limiting the availability of IVF would have to serve a compelling state
interest through the least restrictive means.51 Legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake.52
This author next will establish that current law being applied to
surrogate mother contracts may not be constitutionally suspect because
restriction of surrogate motherhood may not be infringing upon the
only procreative option of a couple. In addition, the state may be
able to show that restriction of surrogate motherhood is necessary
because of strong state interests against private adoptions and custody
battles. The distinguishing factors between surrogate motherood and
IVF, however, may result in a finding that the state interests are not
as strong when applied to IVF. Therefore, the state laws that con-
stitutionally restrict surrogate motherhood may be constitutionally
suspect when applied to IVF. This author now will focus on the dif-
ferences between surrogate motherhood and IVF and explain why the
state interests restricting surrogate motherhood are not applicable to
the IVF carrier situation.
DISTINGUISHING SURROGATE MOTHER
CONTRACTS AND IVF CONTRACTS
The most significant legal obstacle to the use of an IVF carrier
is judicial refusal to enforce surrogate mother contracts. In surrogate
motherhood, a couple unable to produce a child because of the wife's
infertility contracts with a healthy woman to bear a child 3.5 The woman
agrees to be artificialy inseminated with the husband's semen, carry
the child to term, and surrender the child for adoption at birth. 4
Surrogate birth has the advantage of providing the couple with the
49. Current state laws that may be unconstitutional unless the state can show a compelling
state interest in the regulation include: (1) those laws regarding presumptions of natural parent-
hood, CAL. CIV. CODE §7003; (2) private adoptions, CAL. PENAL CODE §273; and (3) surrogate
mother contracts. See infra notes 53-81 and accompanying text.
50. See Note, supra note 26, at 329.
51. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 26, at 1302; Note, supra
note 25, at 329; Lorio, supra note 14, at 1008.
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
53. See Bowal, supra note 14, at 6.
54. See Comment, supra note 6, at 902; Bowal, supra note 14, at 6.
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biological child of the husband. 51 In some states the use of a sur-
rogate mother may lead to criminal liability.16
Although the surrogate mother and the IVF-carrier situations are
similar, they are distinguishable on the basis of genetic identity. A
surrogate mother is related to the child biologically because she is
the genetic mother of the child she is carrying. The IVF carrier, on
the other hand, does not have the same biological relationship to the
child since the husband and wife are the genetic parents. This distinc-
tion minimizes the policy concerns recognized in surrogate motherhood
when applied to the IVF situation. The same public policy concerns
of private adoption 57 and extensive litigation regarding custody 8 are
likely to be offered as the compelling state interests that would pro-
hibit the use of an IVF carrier. Thus, even if surrogate mother con-
tracts continue to be prohibited, the IVF agreement should be per-
mitted. The differences between IVF and surrogate motherhood reduce
the state interests that are necessary to constitutionally prohibit a hus-
band and wife from using the IVF carrier arrangement. A major argu-
ment that has been advanced to find surrogate mother contracts unen-
forceable is concern about private adoptions and the possibility of
baby-bartering." To understand why these concerns are inapplicable
to IVF, the underlying rationale employed in support of private adop-
tion prohibitions will be analyzed. This author contends that the
underlying policy behind these prohibitions supports their application
to surrogate mother contracts. The differences between surrogate
motherhood and IVF then will be examined. This author will con-
clude that the distinctions between the two techniques should result
in a finding that application of these laws to IVF is inappropriate.
A. Black Market Adoptions
In at least twenty-four states, paying a mother in connection with
the relinquishment of rights to her child is prohibited.6" The typical
55. See Comment, supra note 4, at 387.
56. See Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. UNIV. LAW J. 147,
148. Notwithstanding the fact that these statutes rarely are enforced, their mere existence deters
surrogate motherhood arrangements. Id. at 153. In addition, these statutes render surrogate
mother contracts void and unenforceable as contracts requiring an illegal act. Id. The purpose
of these statutes is to prevent the "sale" of infants. Id. at 152.
57. See infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 60-71.
60. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 52; Goldfarb, Two Mothers, One Baby, No Law, 11
HurAN RIGHTS 27 (1983); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §273.
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baby-buying situation involves a pregnant woman who is unmarried.6 '
The "buyer" takes advantage of the mother, who is not in a finan-
cial position to care for her child.62 The adoptive parents are not
related to the child biologically and no one has ascertained their fitness
for adoption.6 3 In Doe v. Kelley," the Michigan Appeals Court found
that the couple's right of privacy to use a surrogate mother did not
override the compelling interest of the state to forbid financial
agreements from influencing a mother to consent to the adoption of
her child.65 In Kelley, the court refused to allow payment to the sur-
rogate mother; moreover, the court found that the Michigan statute
prohibiting payment in connection with an adoption applied to sur-
rogate motherhood because of a fear that a money market for the
adoption of babies could develop.66
In Kentucky, surrogate mother contracts have been found unen-
forceable because they violate a statute prohibiting a mother from
consenting to an adoption before birth.67 Differentiating between
carrying the child for the husband and wife and being paid for relin-
quishing parental rights to the child is difficult in the case of sur-
rogate motherhood because of the strong concern over the possible
buying and selling of children.6 8 Although payment for carrying a
child and payment for the child may be difficult to distinguish in
the surrogate mother situation, the distinction is clearer in IVF. The
parents are not receiving the genetic child of another woman, as in
surrogate motherhood, but are paying a carrier to carry their child
to term. The carrier is not the victim of an unwanted pregnancy or
coercion on the part of the couple.6 9 She enters into an agreement
to carry another couple's child to term because the wife is incapable
of bearing the child herself." The child is not the genetic offspring
of the carrier. Furthermore, custody of the child is given to the
biological parents in IVF and not to strangers.7 The biological parents
of the IVF child should not be characterized as "buying" their genetic
61. See Keane, supra note 56, at 155.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. 1981).
65. Id. at 441.
66. Id.
67. See Lorio, supra note 14 at 993; Ky. REv. STAT. §199.500.
68. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 993-95; Goldfarb, supra note 60, at 29; Origins, supra
note 1, at 52.
69. See Keane, supra note 56, at 155.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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child, and, therefore, baby-bartering statutes should not be used to
invalidate IVF agreements.
Since private adoption concerns are inapplicable when a couple
decides to use IVF, the custody issues in surrogate motherhood and
IVF must now be examined. Custody issues are a major concern in
surrogate motherhood because the woman who carries the child is
the biological mother. Since the surrogate mother has a genetic rela-
tionship with the child, complicated custody litigation may result from
a controversy between the husband and the surrogate mother. The
state has an interest in protecting children from lengthy custody battles.
This author will offer the argument, however, that concern of pro-
tracted litigation regarding custody is not of the same magnitude in
IVF.
B. Examination of Custody Issues
A surrogate mother is the biological mother of the child. Courts
have been unwilling to enforce a contract when the surrogate mother
agrees to give up her child before birth." Litigation over custody rights
arises when the surrogate mother refuses to give up the child after
birth. In addition, the husband may refuse to take custody of the
child if the baby is defective. The defect may be caused by the sur-
rogate mother's negligence or breach of the terms of the contact."
Court battles could result over who should be primarily responsible
for the child, since both the husband and the surrogate mother are
the biological parents of the child."4
The welfare of the child must be paramount in determining the
validity of surrogate mother contracts. 75 A state rationally could con-
clude that complex litigation regarding support, custody, and visita-
tion rights is not in the best interest of the child. 76 The interest of
the state in protecting children from protracted custody litigation may
be sufficient to show a compelling interest in refusing to recognize
surrogate mother contracts. 77 Upon a showing of a compelling state
72. See Comment, supra note 4, at 393. CAL. PENAL CODE §273; Iowa Code §600A.4(2)(d)
(1981) (consent to adoption cannot be obtained until 72 hours after the birth of the child). See
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 82-143 and accompanying text.
74. CAL. PENAL CODE §270 (criminal liability if legal parent fails to provide for child).
SEE CAL. CIV. CODE §7010 (effect of judgment determining parent and child relationship); CAL.
Civ. CODE §§4700-4732 (support of children).
75. See Bowal, supra note 14, at 25.
76. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, supra note 26, at 1318.
77. Id.
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interest, refusal to recognize the surrogate mother contracts would
not be constitutionally suspect. 78
IVF should not give rise to the same custody concerns because both
the husband and wife would be the biological parents of the child.
The irrebuttable presumption that a woman who bears a child is the
natural mother of that child" requires the IVF wife to adopt her own
biological child from the carrier.8" The IVF carrier, however, has no
genetic link to the infant that statutorily is considered her natural
child. The statutory presumption would treat an IVF carrier and a
surrogate mother alike, and, therefore, the same custody litigation
would ensue. The surrogate mother is the biological mother of the
child and the state can require the wife to adopt the child of the
husband and the surrogate mother only after birth because the state
has an interest in restricting the relinquishment of parental rights before
birth. Since the carrier in IVF is not the biological mother of the
child, the interest of the state in refusing to allow the carrier to give
up any rights to the IVF child before birth is not compelling. Absent
concern over the relinquishment of parental rights before birth, the
state will be unable to show any compelling reason to require the
wife to adopt her child from the carrier. Under current law, custody
litigation will continue to restrict the use of IVF in situations in which
the decision to use IVF may be constitutionally protected."' Therefore,
the statutory presumption of natural motherhood must be changed
to include the possibility that a woman may bear a child not her genetic
offspring.
PARENTAL RIGHTS IN IVF SITUATIONS
In the surrogate mother situation, the wife of the biological father
has to adopt the child after the biological mother, the surrogate, has
terminated her parental rights to the child.8 2 In IVF, the wife of the
biological father is the biological mother.8 3 Current law, embracing
78. Id. If the court determines that a restriction infringes upon a fundamental right, the
restriction will be upheld only if necessary to satisfy a compelling state interest and the restric-
tion is narrowly drawn to express only that interest. See supra note 29, and accompanying text.
79. CAL. CrV. CODE §7003. See State v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 475, 482, 150
Cal. Rptr. 308, 313 (1978) (by law, a parent is the natural guardian entitled to custody of
the child).
80. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 25-52 and accompanying text (discussion of the constitutional implica-
tions of IVF).
82. See supra notes 53-81 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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the concern over the buying and selling of children, prohibits relin-
quishment of parental rights to children that do not yet exist.8 4 Cur-
rent law requires the wife using IVF to adopt her genetic child from
a woman who carried the child to term but is not genetically the
mother."5
Precluding the wife from adopting her child until after the carrier
has terminated her statutory parental rights could result in subsequent
custody battles between the carrier, who would be the presumptive
natural mother, and the true biological parents.8 6 If the carrier decided
to keep the child after birth, the genetic parents would have difficul-
ty obtaining custody of their child.17 The legitimacy of the IVF child
and the custody rights of the parents should be determined before
the birth of the child.88 Since infants tend to form psychological ties
with the person who has custody, deciding the custody issue before
birth is in the best interest of the child.89 In addition, the state has
an interest in protecting the family unit and the child from custody
battles that could arise if the rights are not decided until after birth.9"
The implications of current law when applied to the custody issues
created by IVF now must be addressed. Certain recommendations on
how legally to accomodate IVF also will be discussed.
A. Who is the Father?
If current law is not amended to provide parental rights to the couple
before the birth of an IVF child, the husband still could claim pater-
nity of the child. If the carrier is not married, the husband will have
less difficulty showing that he is the father because no competing legal
claim to paternity exists.9' If the IVF carrier is married, the IVF hus-
band would have to rebut the strong presumption that a woman's
husband is the father of her children born during marriage.92 To rebut
84. See Comment, supra note 4, at 393; CAL. PENAL CODE §273; IOWA CODE §600.3(2)
(1981) (requiring a termination of parental rights before an adoption petiton can be filed);
supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (explanation of baby-bartering concerns).
85. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 53; Comment, supra note 4, at 393.
86. See Comment, supra note 4, at 393.
87. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 53.
88. See Comment, supra note 6, at 923.
89. See Keane, supra note 56, at 168-69.
90. See Comment, supra note 6, at 923. Not only will the family unit benefit, but society
in general will benefit if the legitimacy of the IVF child is established prior to the birth of
the child. Id. Determining legitimacy can prevent subsequent disputes involving custody, sup-
port, and inheritance rights. Comment, supra note 4, at 393.
91. See Sappideen, The Surrogate Mother-A Growing Problem, 6 U. NEw S. VALES L.J.
79, 86 (1983).
92. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 53.
1985 / In Vitro Fertilization
the presumption and succeed in a custody suit, a biological father
must prove two elements. First, he must show beyond a reasonable
doubt 93 that he is the biological father." Blood tests or testimony
of the physician who performs the IVF probably would be sufficient
to establish this requirement.9 Once paternity is established, the
biological father must show that placing custody of the child with
him, instead of the woman who gave birth to the child, would be
in the best interest of the child. 96 Showing that the interests of the
child would best be served by placing the child with the genetic parents
in the IVF situation would not be as difficult as attempting to remove
the child from the custody of a surrogate mother. In IF, the carrier
would be opposing the biological parents. In surrogate motherhood,
both parties claiming custody, the husband and the surrogate mother,
would be biological parents. 97
State law that forces the use of paternity suits and adoption to
obtain custody of their child leaves the husband and wife in a
precarious situation because of the possibility that the carrier may
change her mind and want to keep the child. Alternatively, if artificial
insemination by donor statutes, although not drafted in anticipation
of IVF, are applied, the carrier and her husband might find themselves
legally responsible for the IVF child if the IVF husband and wife
refuse to take custody.9 8 Artificial insemination statutes consider the
husband of the woman artificially inseminated as the father of the
child because the husband consents to the use of the wife's reproduc-
tive abilities in order to have a child.99 Application of the artificial
insemination statutes may lead a court to conclude that the husband
of the carrier, by consenting to the use of her reproductive abilities
through IVF, has become the legal parent of the child.' 0
Although the IVF husband can prove paternity notwithstanding any
93. See Smith, supra note 3, at 652.
94. See Comment, supra note 4, at 394-95.
95. See W. STATSKY, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS, 376 (1978) (analogy can be made to evidence
required to rebut the presumption when a woman is artificially inseminated).
96. Unless the natural mother presumption is changed, the IVF carrier would be in the
same position as a surrogate mother. See Annas, Contracts to Bear a Child: Compassion and
Commercialism?, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23, 24 (April 1981); Smith, supra note 3, at 652.
97. See W. STATSKY, supra note 95, at 382. A strong presumption favors an award of
custody to biological parents that would work against the IVF carrier. Id. In surrogate
motherhood, the presumption would work equally in favor of the surrogate mother and the
husband because they both are biological parents. Id.
98. See Sappideen, supra note 91, at 85; Note, supra note 35, at 616.
99. CAL. CMy. CODE §7005. The husband's consent must be in writing. Id.
100. See Sappideen, supra note 91, at 85; Note, supra note 35, at 616.
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action by the carrier or her husband, a more troublesome issue is
deciding who the mother is. The IVF wife is the genetic mother of
the infant, but without the use of the carrier's womb, the child would
not have been born.'"' The states must develop a legal framework
to decide which woman, the wife or the IVF carrier, is the legal
mother. Absent this framework, the decision to use IVF, possibly a
constitutionally protected right, may not be available to couples who
are unable to have children.' 0 2 In addition, new laws are needed to
avoid custody battles between the couple and the IVF carrier that
will arise if current laws are applied.' 3
B. Who is the Mother?
Under the common law'04 and most state statutes,' including
California,' 6 a child born to a married woman is presumptively the
child of that woman and her spouse.' 7 The presumption is appropriate
in most instances because this ensures legitimization of the child. The
best interests of both the child and the state are served' since parental
support for the child is assured.' 9 The presumption is contrary to
the best interest of the child in the IVF situation, however, because
the carrier is presumed to be the natural mother of the child'O and
her husband the father,"' even though neither are genetically related
to the child. The biological parents, the husband and wife, are pre-
cluded from obtaining custody of the child if the presumption is
followed and the carrier refuses to relinquish custody." 2
The natural mother presumption became law before the possibility
of a woman carrying a child that was not her genetic child was
imagined. The gestational link between the infant and the woman carry-
ing the child to term provides for the argument that the natural mother
presumption should remain, despite the IVF possibiliity, because of
101. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 993.
102. See supra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
104. See Note, supra note 35, at 614 n.80.
105. Id. at 614 n.81.
106. CAL. CIV. CODE §7003.
107. See Note, supra note 35, at 614.
108. See W. Statsky, supra note 95, at 453. Historically, the purpose of this presumption
was to prevent bastardization of the child, and to ensure the legal status of the child. Id.;
H. KRAus, FAMImY LAW 397 (1976).
109. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
110. CAL. CIV. CODE §7003.
111. Note, supra note 35, at 614.
112. Id. at 614 n.83.
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the effect the uterine environment has on the development of the
fetus." 3 The argument becomes more complicated due to the conti-
nuing controversy whether intelligence is ordained genetically or nur-
tured by the environment within the maternal host and affected by
the stresses that affect the woman carrying the child." 4 Studies have
established the possibility that the major determinants of viability,
physical growth and health, mental ability, and personality, may be
those that operate during gestation." 5 Any etiological study of dif-
ferences in personality, intelligence, and health no longer is complete
without taking prenatal factors into consideration." '
The importance of the uterine environment to the subsequent
development of the child is largely unknown. 7 The gestational link
argument may support maintaining a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the carrier." 8 In light of the arguments favoring a constitutionally
protected right for an infertile couple to use IVF, however, the non-
rebuttable presumption of natural motherhood now in effect should
be modified." 9
C. Possible Changes in the Law
1. Artificial Insemination by Donor
Litigation involving IVF situations may ensue before IVF legisla-
tion is enacted. The cases involving artificial insemination by donor,
although not drafted in contemplation of IVF, may be used by analogy
in the absence of specific IVF legislation. 20 The artificial insemina-
tion donor is donating his sperm much like the IVF carrier is donating
113. See Sappideen, supra note 91, at 86. In addition, recent artificial insemination by donor
cases and child placement decisions have stressed the idea that a genetic relationship between
the parent and child is not necessarily the most important factor to consider when deciding
custody issues. Id. at 86-87.
114. Id. See generally TnE 1.0. CONTROVERSY 474 (N.J. Block and G. Dworkin eds. 1976)
(discussion of the different elements affecting intelligence).
115. MODERN PERSPECIVES IN INTERNAIONAL CHILD PsYCHIATRY 27-37 (J. Howells Ist U.S.
ed. 1971); Sappideen, supra note 94, a 86-87.
116. See Sappideen, supra note 94, at 86-87.
117. Id. at 86.
118. The carrier's right to the child should be weaker than the right of the husband and
wife due to the fact that the carrier would be opposing both genetic parents. See Lorio, supra
note 14, at 996.
119. See supra notes 25-52 and accompanying text (discussion of constitutional argument). See
supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text (discussion of changing the current statutory
presumption).
120. See Note, supra note 26, at 328. Most artificial insemination by donor statutes man-
date that children conceived by artificial insemination are presumed to be legitimate for all
purposes. Id.
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the use of her womb.' 2 ' The donor is allowed to relinquish his right
to the child before birth and the husband of the woman inseminated
by the donated sperm is presumptively the father of the child.'22 This
avoids adoption and custody litigation regarding the child after birth,
which is in the best interest of the child.'23 In addition, the sperm
donor is relieved of any responsibility for the child.'24
In the absence of legislation specifically enacted to regulate IVF,
courts could follow artificial insemination by donor law in IVF situa-
tions to allow the carrier to relinquish any rights to the child before
birth.'25 The fact that the artificial insemination donor statutorily is
allowed to relinquish any rights to his genetic child before birth may
persuade a court to enforce the IVF contract and allow a carrier,
who is only the gestational carrier and has no genetic link to the child,
contractually to relinquish parental rights notwithstanding the statutory
presumption that she is the natural mother.'26 In IVF cases, the respon-
sibility of support would remain with the husband and wife if the
artificial insemination by donor cases are used by analogy.' 27
Significant differences exist, however, between IVF and the artificial
insemination by donor situation. An artificial insemination donor never
has physical contact with the child, while an IVF carrier gives nine
months of her life and creates an emotional bond with the life inside
her.'28 In addition, a change of physical custody-taking the infant
from the carrier and placing the child with the husband and wife-is
not necessary in an artificial insemination by donor situation, but must
121. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 996.
122. See ARK. STAT. AN. §61-141(c)(1983); CAL. CIV. CODE §7005; COLO. REV. STAT.§19-6-106 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. §45-69f (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §742.11 (West 1973);
MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §1-206(b) (1974); MONT. CODE ANN. §40-6-106 (1981); N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAW §75 (McKinney 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. §49A-1 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10 §552 (West 1982-83); OR. REv. STAT. §109.243 (1981); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §12.03
(Vernon 1977); VA. CODE §64.1-7.1 (1980); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §26.26.050(1) (West 1983-84);
Lorio, supra note 14, at 988-89. "Father" in the California support statute was interpreted
to include a "husband who is unable to accomplish his objective of creating a child by using
his own semen, purchases semen from a donor and uses it to inseminate his wife to achieve
his purpose." People v. Sorenson 68 Cal. 2d 280, 286, 437 P.2d 495, 499-500, 66 Cal. Rptr.
7, 12 (1968).
123. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
124. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 53.
125. The legislation also could provide that the carrier relinquish any rights to the child
before the embryo is implanted.
126. See Note, supra note 26, at 328. See notes 104-19 and accompanying text (explaining
the statutory presumption).
127. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
128. See Smith, supra note 3, at 661 (discussion of the emotional ties a surrogate mother
develops with the embryo she carries).
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take place in IVF.' 29 These differences between artificial insemina-
tion by donor and IVF may result in judicial hesitation to apply
artificial insemination by donor principles to IVF cases. 3 ' To avoid
the necessity of utilizing principles of the law not developed in an-
ticipation of IVF, states should adopt legislation that addresses the
technological advances and resulting parentage problems presented by
IVF.
2. Legislative Alternatives to Provide for IVF
California should enact legislation to ensure that use of a woman's
womb will not, in itself, lead to the conclusive presumption that she
is the natural mother of the child. The California Surrogate Parent
Act of 1982' 3 divided parentage between the surrogate mother and
the biological father.'32 Application of divided parentage in IVF would
accommodate the husband because he no longer would be required to
rebut the presumption that the husband of the carrier is the father
of the IVF child. The provision is inadequate, however, because there
would be no change in the legal status of the wife. If the carrier
decided to keep the child, the wife would have difficulty obtaining
custody.'3 3
Statutes could address surrogate motherhood and IVF by providing
that a child is presumed to be the legitimate child of the sperm donor
and his wife, regardless of whether she carries the child or supplies
the ovum.' A similar presumption was included in a Kansas pro-
posal which provided that a child born with the use of a surrogate
mother would be presumed to be the child of the sperm donor and
his wife.' 35 With the enactment of this presumption, the wife of the
129. See Comment, supra note 4, at 394 (using the change of physical custody to distinguish
surrogate motherhood arrangements and artificial insemination by donor).
130. See Note, supra note 26, at 328.
131. Assembly Bill 3771, 1981-82 Regular Session (proposed additions and amendments to
§§7500-7518 of the CAL. Crv. CODE).
132. Id. §7508(b).
The husband shall be presumed to be the father of any child born to a woman
who agrees to act as a surrogate pursuant to this part that was conceived during
that period of time in which it was possible for her to have conceived as a result
of insemination pursuant to a contract incorporated in a petition approved pursuant
to this part. Id.
See Note, supra note 35, at 624-25.
133. The wife would be in the same position as the wife of a sperm donor in a surrogate
mother situation. See notes, supra note 35, at 624-25. The divided parentage presumption sub-
jects the wife of the sperm donor to custody battles if the surrogate mother decides not to
relinquish custody of the child. Id.
134. See Lorio, supra note 14 at 1010.
135. See Note, Contractual Issues, supra note 35, at 619. Kansas Senate Bill No. 485, §2(b).
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sperm donor would not be required to adopt the child after birth.
Custody, support, and physical responsibility for the child would be
decided early and the surrogate, who is not within the nuclear family,
would be relieved by statute of all legal rights and obligations to the
child.'36 The Kansas proposal, however, included a second presump-
tion of dual parentage shared by the surrogate mother and the sperm
donor if the surrogate mother declares the surrogate mother contract
void.' 3 The second presumption, if applied to the IVF situation, would
give the carrier the unilateral ability to create the same adoption-before-
birth disputes that should be avoided.' 38 The husband and wife may
be denied an award of custody of their biological child. Ironically,
the husband still could be responsible for support of the child because
of the dual parentage presumption.' 39
The interests of the child must be paramount when considering new
proposals. The state has a strong interest in ensuring that support
for the child clearly is established before birth. 40 Since both husband
and wife are the biological parents of the child, they should be
primarily responsible for support of a child born through the use of
IVF. Unlike the surrogate mother, the IVF carrier is not a biological
parent. The law should provide that she can relinquish any claim to
the child before the embryo is implanted. At that time, the carrier
should no longer be responsible for support or physical custody of
the child upon birth.
California law should provide a new presumption when IVF is used.
If the sperm donor and egg donor are married' 4' and choose to use
That proposal provided:
Unless a surrogate mother declares a contract under section 9 to be void, any
child born as a result of heterologous artificial insemination pursuant to the contract
and in accordance with this act shall be considered at law in all respects the same
as a naturally conceived child of the sperm donor and his wife. If the surrogate
mother declares the contract to be void, any child born as a result of heterologous
artificial insemination pursuant to the contract and in accordance with the provisions
of this act shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived
child of the sperm donor and the surrogate mother, and the sperm donor shall have
all rights and responsibilities of a natural father. Id.
136. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 1010.
137. See Note, supra note 35, at 619.
138. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text (explanation of adoption-before-birth
problems giving rise to public policy concerns).
139. See Note, supra note 35, at 619.
140. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
141. The marriage requirement is necessary to provide for the possibility of a couple who
needs to use the egg of an anonymous donor fertilized with the sperm of the husband and
implanted in his wife. With no marriage requirement, the egg donor, and not the wife being
implanted with the embryo, would be presumed to be the natural mother.
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IVF to bring their child to term, the law should provide that the
husband-sperm donor and the wife-egg donor are the natural parents
of the child no matter whose womb is used to carry the child to term.
Under this presumption, the husband and wife would be responsible
for support of the child. Moreover, the IVF carrier would not have
the opportunity to declare the contract void and unilaterally declare
herself the natural mother, as in the Kansas surrogate mother
proposal,'42 because she is not the biological mother. The carrier would
know before implantation that she has no legal rights or obligation
concerning the IVF child.
Litigation concerning the rights and obligations of the parties would
be minimized because the husband and wife would be in the same
position as natural parents and would not be able to challenge their
responsibility for support of the child.' 3 Other issues concerning the
rights of the husband, wife, and the carrier still must be resolved.
The problems of contractual control over the carrier's activities during
gestation, abortion, and visitation rights now will be explored.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE HUSBAND, WIFE, AND CARRIER
The emergence of IVF, especially when a third party carrier is in-
volved, will present difficult questions for the courts. Many areas of
the law that have been considered well-settled will be challenged by
new and unanticipated factual situations. The problems surrounding
visitation rights, the decision to terminate the pregnancy, and restric-
tion of the IVF carrier's activities must be explored before the
widespread implications involved in IVF can be appreciated. Develop-
ment of the fetus will be of primary importance to the couple.
Therefore, the husband and the wife will want to contractually restrict
the carrier's activity during the gestational period.
A. Right to Control the Carrier's Actions
Since the uterine environment strongly influences the health of the
fetus, the activities of the carrier potentially could harm the child.'44
The husband and wife will seek to ensure that the carrier will do
what is necessary for the health of the child. The carrier likely will
attempt to remain emotionally detached from the child and may not
142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
143. See CAL. Crv. CODE §270.
144. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 56. A surrogate mother gave birth to a child with fetal
alcohol syndrome due to the surrogate mother's alcoholism. Id.
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be as concerned with the development of the fetus.'"" The limits of
the contractual rights to restrict the activities of the carrier need to
be defined as do the remedies in case of a breach.
Requiring a certain number of medical check-ups during the
pregnancy will be an important part of the IVF agreement for the
husband and wife. Certain activities, such as drinking, smoking, and
drug consumption are known to have a deleterious effect on the fetus 4 '
and the husband and wife will want to place restrictions in the IVF
agreement on the carrier's ability to engage in these activities. These
restrictions, which are in the best interest of the child and the cou-
ple, will collide with the civil liberties and personal privacy of the
carrier.147
Enforcement of IVF contracts may not be available since courts
often are unwilling to order specific performance of personal service
agreements.' 4 The possibility that enforcement of restrictions would
severely limit constitutional freedoms of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness will prohibit enforcement of the terms of an IVF con-
tract restricting the physical activities of the carrier.' 4 9 Since the courts
are unwilling or unable to specifically enforce these clauses in the
IVF contract, alternative remedies available to the husband and wife
must be established.
The interests of the unborn child must prevail when considering
enforcement of IVF agreements.' 5 The Kansas proposal regarding sur-
rogate motherhood discussed earlier provided that if the surrogate
mother, who is the biological mother of the child, breaches the sur-
rogate mother contract and engages in activities that result in a defec-
tive child, the presumption that the wife of the sperm donor is the
145. See Bowal, supra note 14, at 25.
146. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 995.
147. See Bowal, supra note 14, at 25.
143. See Millcarek v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 388 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D. Fla.
1975) (newspaper carder); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp 870, 875 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(professional hockey player); Keane, supra note 56, at 167-68.
149. See Note, supra note 35, at 631-32.
While damages are a wholly inadequate remedy for breach of a promise to render
personal services, two analogous difficulties stand in the way of specific enforcement:
1. Long and minute supervision might be needed to secure the proper execution
of the decree.
2. The proper performance of the services to the best of the defendant's ability
is uncertain and difficult to gage. And any attempt to overcome these difficulties
might involve too serious an infringement of personal liberty to be tolerable. Therefore,
such promises are generally not enforceable by affirmative decree.
11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §1423 (3rd ed. 1968).
150. See Bowal, supra note 14, at 25.
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natural mother would change. The surrogate mother would be con-
sidered the natural mother of the child' and would be responsible
for support and custody of the child.'52 Under legislation similar to
the proposal in Kansas the sperm donor husband, being the biological
father, still would be liable for half the support of the child, but
would be entitled to litigate the issue because of the added expense
in rearing a physically or mentally impaired child. ' The possibility
of custody battles over the child between the surrogate mother and
the husband give rise to public concerns over the fate of the child.
These concerns have led courts to refuse to recognize surrogate mother
contracts' 54 since the courts want to protect the child from complex
litigation over custody issues.' 55
In the IVF situation, however, both husband and wife will be con-
sidered the natural parents of the child if the natural mother presump-
tion is changed. 5 6 Like the sperm donor husband who is not relieved
from responsibility for the child because of the surrogate mother's
breach,'" the husband and wife should not be released from respon-
sibiity. The risk of breach of contract resulting in a defective child
should fall on the couple because the state has an interest in assuring
support for the child and avoiding complex custody battles. The hus-
band and wife may be able to sue the carrier for damages resulting
from the breach,15s but the interests of society and the child require
that the husband and wife not be relieved from responsibility for the
child simply because a carrier they contracted with to carry their
embryo did not follow the terms of the contract.' 59 The responsibili-
ty of the couple for the child should begin upon fertilization of the
embryo. The husband and wife will not be forced by a court to ac-
cept an unwanted child, however, because that could jeopardize the
151. See Note, supra note 35, at 619 (discussion of the Kansas proposal).
152. See Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. oF LAW AND MEDICINE 323, 339
(1981).
153. See supra notes 53-81 and accompanying text (discussion of surrogate mother contracts).
154. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 120-43 and accompanying text (discussion of changing the current natural
mother presumption).
157. See Note, supra note 35, at 619.
158. Since damages will be difficult to determine if the carrier breaches the IVF contract,
the husband and wife will want to include in the terms of the contract a liquidated damages
provision in case of a breach. See Bowal, supra note 14, at 25-26. Although the damages clause
may be struck down as a penalty or the carrier may be judgment-proof, hopefully the provi-
sion would act as a deterrent against the carrier breaching the standard of performance to
which she originally consented. Id.
159. See Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. oF LAW AND MEDICINE 323, 339
(1981); Andrews, supra note 2, at 52.
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welfare of the child.' Therefore, if the husband and wife refuse to
accept the child, they should be liable for the cost of adoption'"' or
possibly be ordered to pay lifetime medical expenses or child support.'62
The couple will not only desire an assurance that the IVF carrier
will follow the contractually agreed upon restrictions of certain
activities. The husband and wife must anticipate the possibility that
the carrier may decide to terminate the pregnancy. Conversely, the
couple may want the ability to decide that their embryo should be
aborted. These decisions must be explored in light of the constitu-
tional implications of the right to abortion.
B. The Problems of Abortion163
The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 64 held that a
woman's right of privacy, including her right to have an abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy, is fundamental. 16 State restric-
tions on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights will be upheld
only if the restrictions are necessary to further a compelling state
interest. 6 6 Although a state cannot show a compelliv,, state interest
during the first trimester of pregnancy to justify rest Aing abortions,
the state can show that a viable life exists at the end of the second
160. See Shrrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. oF LAW AND MEDICINE 323, 338
(1981).
161. See Note, supra note 35, at 635 (sperm donor in surrogate motherhood must pay adop-
tion costs if he rejects custody of the child). If the husband and wife in a surrogate mother
situation refuse to take custody, the surrogate mother can put the child up for adoption and
sue the husband and wife for the cost. Keane, supra note 56, at 167.
162. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 52 (couple may be ordered to pay adoption costs in
surrogate situation if they do not take custody of the child).
163. The fact that the parents do not have the right to have their embryo aborted from
the carrier does not indicate necessarily that the embryo has to be implanted once it is fertilized.
A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare: Society Seeks to Define the Problems of the Birth Revolu-
tion, Time, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54. If the embryo was given the right to be implanted, public
policy probably would demand that the husband and wife be responsible for the resulting children.
Id. In most cases this would make IVF an impossible alternative because more than one egg
normally is removed from the ovary. Id. Since fertilization does not occur in every case, several
attempts are made. Id. If the husband and wife were required to implant every embryo, they
ultimately could be responsible for several children. Id. Most experts would deny the right
of implantation to the embryo. Id. Australia recently recognized the right of the parents to
allow the embryo to expire. Id.
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. The Court held that the right of privacy is "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. The risks attendant to an
abortion after the first three months of a pregnancy were considered a compelling state interest
and justify the state in restricting a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy during the first
trimester of the pregnancy. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law, 745-46
(1983).
166. J. NowAK, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law, 745-46 (1983).
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trimester. Therefore, the state has a compelling interest in the poten-
tial life that will justify restrictions on abortions after the second
trimester. 67 The carrier will not lose her right to an abortion when
carrying the embryo of another couple until the second trimester
because the state would be unable to show that "viable" life needed
protection.'68 The husband and wife will find themselves in a posi-
tion similar to a father who is unable to veto the decision of the
mother to abort their child.'6 9 Since statutes requiring spousal con-
sent to abortion have been struck down, any statute giving the IVF
parents control over the decision of the carrier to have an abortion
would be unconstitutional because they would involve state action
restricting abortion within the first trimester.'
If the IVF carrier contractually agrees with the husband and wife
to refrain from having an abortion, however, the state may not be
restricting the carrier's right to an abortion.' 7' Roe v. Wade makes
clear that the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy at any
time is not absolute. 72 Questions remain whether the carrier contrac-
tually can waive her constitutionally protected right to have an
abortion.' 7 Some constitutional rights can be waived,"74 but the waiver
probably is not irrevocable. 75 A contract between the couple and the
carrier restricting or waiving the right of the carrier to terminate her
pregnancy may not be void as against public policy, but the contrac-
tual waiver most likely is revocable by the carrier and unenforceable. 176
Even assuming the carrier contractually can waive her right to have
an abortion, she later may decide to breach the contract and abort.
The carrier could be stopped only by physically preventing her from
obtaining the abortion and requiring her to carry the child to term.
Contract law normally will not specifically enforce contracts for per-
167. Id. at 746. At this point the fetus could have a "meaningful life" outside the mother. Id.
168. Id. see Lorio, supra note 14, at 990.
169. See Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 Am. J. OF LAW AND MEDICINE 323, 334
(1981).
170. Special consent statutes have been struck down as unconstitutional. J. Nowak, R.
Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 165, at 751. The state cannot delegate powers it is prohibited
from exercising. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda
& J. Young, supra note 165, at 751.
171. See Note, supra note 35, at 612.
172. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG supra note 165 at 745-46 (explaining how
the state can restrict a woman's right to have an abortion by a compelling state interest); Note,
supra note 35, at 613.
173. See Note, supra note 35, at 612.
174. The right to a jury trial may be waived. State v. Jelks, 461 P.2d 473, 475 (Ariz. 1969).
175. See Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. OF LAW AND MEDICINE 323, 334
(1981).
176. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 995.
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sonal services.' 77 Courts would be hesitant to specifically enforce an
IVF contract because of the length of a pregnancy. In addition, the
court would be concerned about the negative effects to the potential
child that might be caused by forcing a woman to carry an unwanted
child to term.'78
Unlike the custody issue, therefore, the state cannot protect the
husband and wife from the carrier's decision to abort the IVF child.' 79
Statutory changes in the law would eliminate custody battles between
the couple and the carrier because the statutes can be amended to
provide that the carrier has no legal right over the child/the husband
and wife should be given exclusive custody. The state however can-
not restrict the carrier's right to an abortion during the first trimester.
Any contract between the couple and the carrier cannot be specifically
enforced and the husband and wife will be left with money damages
as their only remedy.
The carrier may be liable in damages for pecuniary loss under the
contract if she aborts the child.' s Although damages for emotional
distress usually are not recoverable in contract actions,,8 courts seem
to be increasingly willing to protect the interest in freedom from emo-
tional distress.' Damages for mental suffering may be granted for
an intentional or reckless breach of contract if the defendant had
reason to know when the contract was entered into that a breach
would cause mental suffering for reasons other than pecuniary loss. 8 3
Since the IVF contract will include a clause restricting the carrier's
ability to abort, the husband and wife will be able to show that this
type of a breach was contemplated at the time the contract was made.
The contract was not entered into on the part of the husband and
wife for pecuniary benefit, but rather for personal and emotional
reasons. Therefore, the husband and wife may be able to convince
a court that emotional distress damages are appropriate for a breach
of an IVF contract.' The parents could sue in tort for intentional
177. 5A Corbin on Contracts §1204 (1964). See Lorio, supra note 14, at 995.
178. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 995.
179. See supra notes 82-143 and accompanying text.
180. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 995.
181. 11 WvILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §1341 (3rd ed. 1968).
182. Id.
183. Id. (citing Kansas City v. Industrial Gas Co. 138 Kan. 755, 28 P.2d 968).
184. The husband and wife will have to show that this breach was particularly likely to
result in serious emotional distress. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 895 (1982). Examples of the
types of breach that have produced emotional distress damages in contract actions are refusal
to comply with a contract for medical services, failure to deliver a bride's trousseau before
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or negligent infliction of emotional distress.' 85 In addition, the hus-
band and wife may be able to recover for the loss of their embryo
through a wrongful death action. 1 6 Determining whether the husband
and wife have standing to sue could pose another problem unless the
husband and wife are considered the natural parents of the embryo.
The husband and wife should not be precluded from bringing a
wrongful death action against the carrier if statutory amendments that
recognize the husband and wife as the natural parents' 7 of the child
upon fertilization are enacted.' 8
If a couple discovers their embryo is mentally or physically deformed
they may choose to have an abortion. The IVF husband and wife will
not have this alternative. The right to have an abortion was guaranteed
in Roe v. Wade because the right to privacy "is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy." '"19 The Roe right will not apply to the wife because she will
not be carrying the child.' 90 The husband and wife could agree contrac-
tually with the carrier that in the case of a defective embryo the carrier
would have an abortion. Again, contract law would not allow specific
enforcement of the agreement because the contract would involve per-
sonal services.' 9' Public policy probably would not allow the husband
and wife to recover damages in this situation and would require the couple
to support the child notwithstanding their desire to have the pregnancy
terminated. In providing for the use of IVF, the state must be assured
that the IVF child will be supported. Society should place the respon-
sibility of support for the child upon the couple utilizing the procedure.
Thus the husband and wife should be responsible for the embryo upon
fertilization.' 9
Assuming the IVF carrier has fulfilled her obligations during the
gestational period, and the pregnancy is not terminated, the issue of
visitation rights could arise. The carrier may decide she wants to see
the wedding, harassing collection techniques, an undertaker's breach of his duty, and errors
in delivery of telegrams announcing the death of a family member. 11 Wvn.iSToN ON CON-
TRACTS §1341 (3rd ed. 1968).
185. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §46 (1965). See also Keane, supra note 35, at 167-68
(discussing liability of a surrogate mother).
186. See Note, supra note 35, at 632.
187. See supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
188. See Note, supra note 35, at 633. However, most wrongful death actions involving un-
born children have only been granted to parents of viable unborn children. Id.
189. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
190. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 990.
191. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
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the IVF child after she has relinquished the child to the husband and
wife. Several issues surrounding the visitation problem will be addressed
next.
C. Visitation Rights
Confusion over visitation rights in the IVF situation adds to the
necessity of changing the current statutory natural mother
presumption. 93 If legislation is not enacted to provide legal recogni-
tion of the IVF carrier contract, 94 the courts will be forced to decide
what visitation rights the husband and wife will have if the carrier
refuses to relinquish custody of the child.
Courts are required to award reasonable visitation rights unless visita-
tion would be detrimental to the child. 95 The right to visitation by
natural parents may be protected constitutionally.' 96 Under current
law, the husband will be considered the natural father by a showing
of paternity, 97 which probably could be proven by testimony of the
IVF doctor. 9  With advances in medical technology, the wife may
be able to prove her biological interest in the child in the same man-
ner. When granting visitation rights, however, the welfare of the child
is of primary importance.' 99 The IVF child might be confused by the
existence of two mothers and possibly two fathers. The husband and
wife may have difficulty showing that the interests of the child are
best served by allowing visitation rights. As a result, a carrier who
agreed to carry the embryo of another couple to term may be able
to effect the denial of not only custodial but also visitation rights
to the biological parents.
The husband and wife would be left only with a monetary damages
remedy based upon the contract with the carrier or upon tort theory.
The husband and wife most likely will be able to show that they suf-
fered from emotional distress and disappointment resulting from their
failed parental aspirations. Unfortunately, damages for emotional
distress usually are not recoverable in contract actions, unless, as
193. See supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 120-43 and accompanying text (discussion of enforcing IVF contracts),
195. See Note, supra note 35, at 616-17 n.90.
196. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658. See Note, supra note 35, at 616-17 n. 90.
197. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text (discussion of proving paternity).
198. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
199. CAL. CIV. CODE §4601. Reasonable visitation rights will be awarded to a parent unless
the visitation rights would be detrimental to the best interest of the child. Id. See Wingard
v. Sill, 576 P.2d 620, 624-25 (Kan. 1978); Note, supra note 35, at 617.
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discussed previously, the husband and wife can show that serious emo-
tional distress was the foreseeable result of this type of breach at
the time the contract was made.2"' An alternative theory of recovery
might be intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.2",
The result of either possible suit would be frustrated by the fact that
few women who become carriers will be able to satisfy a substantial
judgment." 2
Other visitation right concerns involve those of the carrier. Once the
carrier relinquishes custody of the child to the husband and wife, even
if no change is made in the statutory presumption, the courts should
not recognize any legal relationship between the carrier and the child. 20 3
The carrier, however, may attempt to assert visitation rights because she
is presumptively the natural mother.
The artificial insemination by donor cases can be used by analogy
to refuse visitation rights to the carrier. In the artificial insemination
by donor cases, the sperm donor relinquishes any obligations and
rights, including visitation rights to the child.20 4 In C.M. v. C.C.,205
an unmarried woman who had been artificially inseminated by the
sperm of a friend was required to allow visitation privileges to the
sperm donor. 206 The sperm donor had to convince the court that visita-
tion rights were in the best interest of the child because welfare of
the child is the primary factor when determining visitation rights.20 7
The carrier would be unable to make the same showing and convince
a court that she should be entitled to visitation rights.20 8 The courts
must consider that the welfare of the child will not be served by the
interference with the relationship between the child and the biological
and custodial parents.209 If the proposed changes in the natural mother
presumption are adopted, an IVF carrier would have no grounds to
200. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
201. See Keane, supra note 35, at 167-68 (discussing liability of a surrogate mother who
did not relinquish custody of the child); Note, supra note 35, at 632; see also supra note 185
and accompanying text (discussion of emotional distress damages if the carrier terminates the
pregnancy).
202. See Keane, supra note 56, at 167-68 (discussion of liability of surrogate mother).
203. See Comment, supra note 6, at 923.
204. CAL. CIV. CODE §7005. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
205. 377 A.2d 821 (N.J. Super. 1977).
206. Id. at 822. See Smith, supra note 3, at 643.
207. See Smith, supra note 3, at 643.
208. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
209. The IVF carrier's relationship with the IVF child only would cause confusion and com-
plications in the child's family unit. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussion
of how IVF carrier could exclude husband and wife from visiting their child if she refused
to relinquish custody of the child).
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claim visitation rights because the husband and wife would be con-
sidered the natural parents of the child. The carrier would not be
considered a biological parent and would have no legal relationship
with the IVF child. 210
CONCLUSION
IVF clearly is a future alternative for couples who are unable to
have children through natural conception. Current laws invalidating
surrogate mother contracts, as well as statutory irrebuttable presump-
tions declaring the woman who bears a child the natural mother of
that child, will interfere with the availability of IVF. Several Supreme
Court cases outlining a constitutionally protected zone of marital
privacy, may embrace the right of infertile couples to use IVF as a
means of having children. If IVF is a constitutionally protected right,
the states will have to develop a legal framework that provides for
the IVF alternative unless a compelling state interest exists for the
restriction of the technique. Even if the IVF procedure is not a con-
stitutionally protected right, the distinguishing features between sur-
rogate motherhood and IVF arrangements, combined with the desire
to provide alternatives for couples who are unable to have children
of their own, should convince the states to change their laws to
recognize IVF contracts.
This author has demonstrated that a state may meet the burden
of showing a compelling state interest in restricting the use of sur-
rogate motherhood because of the complex issues of support, custody,
and visitation rights that can result if the surrogate mother or the
husband and wife breach the contract. The same concerns do not
arise when an infertile couple fertilizes their embryo in vitro for im-
plantation in a woman who is not genetically related to the child.
Therefore, the state will not be able to show the compelling state
interest needed to justify restrictions on the IVF procedure.
The other major obstacle restricting IVF in California is the ir-
rebutable statutory presumption providing that the natural mother is
the woman who carried the child to term. Unless state legislators begin
to examine the law and enact statutes that remove restrictions pro-
hibiting couples from using IVF, including this statutory presump-
tion, the courts will be forced to decide custody issues without statutory
210. See supra notes 130-43 and accompanying text (discussion of possible changes in the
statutory presumption of who is considered the natural mother).
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guidelines because IVF may be constitutionally protected. To avoid
this problem and to ensure that responsibility for the support and
custody of an IVF child will not be questioned, California should
provide statutorily that a couple who chooses to use the IVF pro-
cedure will be responsible for the support of the embryo from the
time of fertilization. The couple should not be allowed to relinquish
this responsibility even in the case of a breach of contract on the
part of the carrier causing a defective embryo. The current statutory
presumption considering the natural mother of a child to be the mother
who bore that child should be changed to provide that the wife-egg
donor and the husband-sperm donor, who are married and using IVF
and an IVF carrier, are the presumed natural parents of the child.
Daniel Logan Barnett
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
